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Local government in advanced economies is undergoing a period of rapid reform 
aimed at enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness. Accordingly, the definition, 
measurement and improvement of organisational performance is crucial. Despite 
the importance of efficiency measurement in local government it is only relatively 
recently that econometric and mathematical frontier techniques have been applied 
to local public services. This paper attempts to provide a synoptic survey of the 
comparatively few empirical analyses of efficiency measurement in local 
government. We examine both the measurement of inefficiency in local public 
services and the determinants of local public sector efficiency. The implications of 
efficiency measurement for practitioners in local government are examined by 
way of conclusion. 
EFFICIENCY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 
Public sector reform has now been underway for more than a decade in many developed 
countries and shows few signs of abating. Typically reforms have been directed at reducing 
the size of the public sector and increasing its efficiency. For instance, in the United Kingdom 
a vigorous program of privatisation has taken place and the civil service has been radically 
restructured through the Next Steps initiatives, with numerous services previously provided by 
public agencies at the central and local government level competitively tendered and 
contracted out to private firms. Similarly, in Canada a comprehensive reform program 
designed to improve public sector performance has been followed under the Public Service 
2000 program. In Australia, the Commonwealth Public Service has experienced dramatic 
changes over the period from 1983 to 1993.  
In the United States, the quest for a government that “works better and costs less” has 
been assigned a high priority by the Clinton administration and the resultant National 
Performance Review taskforce has instigated a new system of performance assessment. But 
the most far-reaching and comprehensive program of public sector reform has been adopted in 
New Zealand, which has developed the concept of the ‘contract state’. The similarities in the 
public sector reform programs followed in these countries, with their typical mix of 
commercialisation, corporatisation, deregulation of public sector management, performance 
monitoring and contracting-out, clearly all seek to enhance efficiency in the public sector. 
Evaluating the success of these programs depends crucially on how accurately and 
appropriately efficiency can be measured, and this forms the focus of the present paper which 
seeks to survey the empirical analyses of efficiency measurement in local government. WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
 
2
This work is important because it is only relatively recently that attempts been made to 
apply econometric and mathematical frontier techniques to the efficiency of local 
governments in the provision of local public services. Indeed, whilst the application of 
efficiency analysis to private sector activity, especially in the area of financial services, are 
now commonplace, comprehensive studies of public sector efficiency at any level are rare. 
However, the need for the application of improved productivity measurement in the public 
sector appears indisputable, especially as policy-makers’ interest in public outcomes has 
grown with the scale of the resources involved.  
The paper itself is divided into five main areas. The first section examines the nature 
of local government performance measurement and the inherent difficulties involved in this 
process. The second section briefly discusses the theoretical basis of frontier efficiency 
measurement techniques. The third section examines the literature in the empirical 
measurement of inefficiency in local public services. The fourth section discusses the 
determinants of local public sector efficiency. The paper ends with some brief concluding 
remarks. 
THE NATURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT 
Local government service delivery has come under increased scrutiny with the ongoing 
process of reform. In the absence of contestable markets, and the information and incentives 
provided by these markets, performance information, particularly measures of comparative 
performance, have been seen as a means by which interested parties can gauge the provision 
of local government services. The potential users of this information are threefold. Firstly, the 
recipients (or clients, users, customers or consumers) of these services can use this publicly 
available information to exercise client choice more effectively, and ensure the transparency 
and accountability of service providers for taxpayer funds. Second, the providers or purchasers 
of services, governments, departments and service providers, can also make use of 
performance measures. Possible uses include the stimulation of policy development by 
highlighting influences on the operating environment, facilitating the monitoring of public 
sector managerial performance, and the promotion of ‘yardstick’ or benchmark competition 
for improving performance in areas where there is little competition in markets for inputs 
and/or outputs. These measures can also be used as an analytical tool in examining 
relationships between alternative agencies and programs and as a means of assisting resource 
allocation by way of linking allocated funding with agency and/or program objectives. Finally, 
performance measurement can be used as a managerial decision-making tool. Attention can 
thereby be focused on practices in similar organisations that may assist the attainment of 
agency/program objectives, and thus facilitate programs of performance improvement. 
The problem of measuring the performance of private or public sector organisations is 
fundamental to any economy concerned with the accountability, transparency, efficiency and 
effectiveness of these institutions. In the private sector it has long been assumed that, in the 
long run, the discipline imposed by the marketplace motivates corporations to strive for cost 
efficiency and profit maximisation, facilitated by feedback from the markets for capital, 
corporate control and managerial labour. These include measures derived from profits, rates of 
return on assets, investment and invested capital, market shares and market power. 
In contrast, the local public sector is generally seen to lack both an analogue for profit-
seeking behaviour and an adequate feedback system to assess the quality of decisions. It is 
argued that there are five main aspects of government services that may make it difficult to 
develop accurate performance indicators. First, the outputs of a service provider may be 
complex and/or multiple (Mark, 1986; Hatry and Fisk, 1992). Furthermore, there may be EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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difficulty in establishing cause and effect between the activities of a service and the final 
outcomes it seeks to influence, and these may be evident only after considerable time 
(SCRCSSP, 1998: 7). Second, government organisations may encounter problems in 
identifying the cost of producing and delivering services (Ammons, 1986, 1992; Ganley and 
Cubbin, 1992). For example, there may be difficulty apportioning costs across different 
services or the costs of a given program over long periods of time. Certainly, this problem has 
been mitigated by the introduction of systems of management accounting and accrual 
accounting (SCRCSSP, 1998a: 7). Third, complexity in government services may exist due to 
the interplay of related services and programs (Epstein, 1992; Carter, Klein and Day, 1995). 
For instance, performance indicators may need to capture the positive and negative spillover 
effects of service provision (SCRCSSP, 1997: 16). Fourth, there are potentially many users of 
governmental performance information. Different lines of accountability and the disparate 
informational requirements of government, taxpayers, employers, staff, consumers and 
contractors create additional complications in performance measurement (SCRCSSP, 1997: 
16). For example, the Australian Industry Commission’s (1997: 58) report on Australian local 
government performance indicators received a number of submissions suggesting that the 
“most relevant measure for the Commonwealth and state governments may be a financial 
measure, but for local government and its community stakeholders it is [the focus] on 
outcome measurements and the effectiveness of resource inputs”. Finally, a number of 
restrictions placed by these stakeholders may impinge upon the theoretical ability of 
government entities to improve performance, and therefore bring the orientation of 
performance information into question. For example, Ammons (1986: 191) argued that the 
intergovernmental mandating of expenditures and intergovernmental grant provisions may 
restrict the ability of government bodies to modify behaviour, whereas Miller (1992) 
maintains that the budget process itself has an important contribution to the notion of 
performance. 
Many of these characteristics are closely aligned with Wolf’s (1989) four basic 
attributes of nonmarket or public sector supply. Firstly, he argues that “nonmarket outputs are 
often hard to define in principle, ill-defined in practice, and extremely difficult to measure as 
to quantity or to evaluate as quality” (Wolf, 1989: 51). Accordingly, inputs generally become 
a proxy measure for output (Dollery and Worthington, 1996b: 29). Secondly, nonmarket 
outputs are usually produced by a single public agency, often operating as a legally constituted 
monopoly. The resultant lack of competition makes meaningful estimates of economic 
efficiency difficult, and consequently obscures allocative and productive efficiencies. Thirdly, 
Wolf (1989: 52) argues that the “technology of producing nonmarket outputs is frequently 
unknown, or if known, is associated with considerable uncertainty and ambiguity”. This may 
serve to further obscure notions of performance in the local public sector. Finally, Wolf 
(1989) proposes that nonmarket production activity is also usually characterised by the lack of 
any ‘bottom-line’ evaluation mechanism equivalent to appraising success. Moreover, there is 
often no specified procedure for terminating unsuccessful production (Dollery and 
Worthington, 1996b: 29). 
One generic assessment framework that has been widely used in public sector services 
is detailed in Figure 1 (Industry Commission, 1997; SCRCSSP, 1998). The approach is 
largely based upon the premise that in order to analyse performance a suite of outcome 
indicators should be considered collectively. Overall performance is divided into two 
components: (i) efficiency, which describes how well an organisation uses resources in 
producing services; that is, the relationship between the actual and optimal combination of 
inputs used to produce a given bundle of outputs, and (ii) effectiveness, the degree to which a 
system achieves its program and policy objectives. In turn, effectiveness encompasses a WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
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number of different desired aspects of service linked to program outcome objectives. These 
are: (i) appropriateness (matching service to client needs); (ii) accessibility (aspects such as 
affordability, representation amongst priority groups and physical accessibility); and (iii) 
quality (the process of meeting required standards or incidence of service failures). 










However, this framework, whilst comprehensive, is argued to suffer from a number of 
limitations. First, some authors have argued that the traditional public sector performance 
framework is too narrowly focused. For example, Carter, Klein and Day (1993: 37) support an 
additional category in the form of ‘economy’ with an exclusive focus on “the purchase and 
provision of services at the lowest possible cost consistent with a specified objective”. Some 
authors have proposed restricting effectiveness to measuring the achievement of targets or 
objectives, and introducing ‘efficacy’ so as to measure the impact of services on the 
community. Still others have supported a similar argument for ‘equity’, so as to highlight the 
distinction between administrative and policy effectiveness. However, Carter, Klein and Day 
(1993) argue that doing so may increase the focus of effectiveness on administrative 
effectiveness and reduce the incentive to produce ‘efficacy’ and ‘equity’ or policy-related 
outcomes. 
A second problem is that the generic performance framework makes no specific 
allowance for identifying additional variables relating to efficiency and the still largely 
unmeasured concept of effectiveness (Mann, 1986). These ‘contextual’ variables include 
environmental characteristics relating to the input/output set and the task environment, 
individual characteristics such as motivation and incentive, and structural characteristics 
relating to the degree of centralisation, hierarchy and leadership style (Johnson and Lewin, 
1984: 230). For example, the Australian Industry Commission (1997: 53) has argued that 
contextual information serves two main purposes.  EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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First, it clarifies the environmental constraints on performance, aiding 
interpretation of the indicators. Second, it helps ensure that what is being reported 
as an indicator of performance is not merely an indicator of activity. For example, 
expenditure per capita on a particular service is not an indicator of performance 
unless the nature of the service is tightly defined. 
Alternatively, Ammons (1992: 119) has argued that contextual information forms ‘barriers’ to 
performance analysis. That is, ‘environmental barriers’, such as political factors and 
intergovernmental relations, ‘organisational barriers’, including inadequate information 
systems and bureaucratic structures,  and ‘personal barriers’ such as managerial risk 
avoidance, implies that the concept of public sector ‘performance’ will always be 
compromised by largely unmeasured sets of contextual information. 
In practical terms, the lack of treatment of contextual information is likely to affect 
interpretation in three ways. Firstly, “organisations may pursue different objectives and this 
may be important when assessing services designed to local preferences” (SCRSSP, 1998: 
18). Ignoring these differences could stifle local initiative and encourage uniformity, even 
when this is clearly inefficient. Secondly, the clients of services may differ across 
jurisdictions. For example, an increase in the aged proportion of the population in a local 
government area can affect the measured efficiency of aged community services. Finally, 
organisations may face different input prices (even when these can be accurately measured) or 
operate at different scales of operation. For instance, it is to a service provider’s advantage to 
ensure its operations are of optimal size: that is, neither too small if there are increasing 
returns-to-scale, nor too large, if there are decreasing returns-to-scale. Clearly, an appropriate 
performance framework should take account of factors which affect a local government’s 
measured efficiency. 
The final problem is that the framework defined above effectively serves to 
‘disaggregate’ performance. This makes the job of selecting and calculating partial 
performance measures more tractable. For example, it is possible to incorporate both 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of service quality, and incorporate partial measures of 
efficiency such as outputs per unit of input. Yet it is also obvious that local governments are 
multi-dimensional entities: a single measure is unlikely to reflect the complexity of decision-
making or the scope of a council’s entire activities. Furthermore, even when individual 
measures are combined using some weighting system, the resultant composite measure is 
ultimately arbitrary, and unlikely to be replicated in any systematic manner. A related issue is 
that the process of ‘disaggregation’ of performance often serves to introduce some confusion 
into the process of performance assessment. For example, the division between efficiency, an 
essentially inward looking form of measurement of the council’s own operations, and 
effectiveness, an outward perspective to the impact of services upon the community, has 
caused some confusion (Epstein, 1992: 167). However, on this point the Australian Industry 
Commission (1997: 103) maintained that: 
 There can be debate about whether various indicators measure effectiveness or 
efficiency, but the classification adopted is not crucial to the value of having an 
overall framework which serves to ensure that all aspects of performance are 
assessed in an integrated way. The same types of indicators will always be 
relevant. 
Notwithstanding the complexities of performance measurement in the local government 
context, as we have seen numerous pressures exist (and are likely to continue) which oblige 
the local government sector to provide transparent assessments of the efficiency of its WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
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operations. The use of frontier efficiency measurement techniques represents a theoretically 
well-developed and statistically advanced method of determining both the absolute and 
relative economic efficiencies of particular local government jurisdictions. We now examine 
this methodology in some detail. 
THE THEORY OF MICROECONOMIC EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT 
Economists have developed three main measures of efficiency. Firstly, technical or productive 
efficiency refers to the use of productive resources in the most technologically efficient 
manner. Put differently, technical efficiency implies the maximum possible output from a 
given set of inputs. In cost terms, this means that an organisation should produce a specified 
level of output in the cheapest possible manner, Secondly, allocative efficient refers to the 
distribution of productive resources amongst alternative uses so as to produce the optimal mix 
of output. In other words, allocative efficiency is concerned with choosing between the 
different technically efficient combinations of outputs. Taken together, allocative efficiency 
and technical efficiency determine the degree of economic efficiency. Thus, if an agency uses 
its resources completely allocatively and technically efficiently, then it can be said to have 
achieved total economic efficiency. Alternatively, to the extent that either allocative or 
technical inefficiency is present, then the organisation will be operating at less than total 
economic efficiency. Thirdly, and in contrast to both allocative efficiency and technical 
efficiency, dynamic efficiency is a much less precise concept. In general, dynamic efficiency 
refers to the economically efficient usage of scare resources through time and thus embraces 
allocative and technical efficiency in an intertemporal dimension. 
The empirical measurement of economic efficiency centres on determining the extent 
of either allocative efficiency or technical efficiency or both in a given organisation or a given 
industry. Economists have employed production possibility frontiers, production functions 
and cost functions in their attempts to measure efficiency in actual organisations and 
industries. Production possibility frontiers map a locus of potentially technically efficient 
output combinations an organisation is capable of producing at any point in time. To the 
extent an organisation fails to achieve an output combination on its production possibility 
frontier, and falls beneath this frontier, it can be said to be technically inefficient. Similarly, to 
the extent to which it produces some combination of goods and services on its production 
frontier, but which do not coincide with the wants of its clients (usually expressed in terms of 
the prices they are willing to pay), it can be said to be allocatively inefficient. Production 
functions provide an analogous means of relating inputs to outputs in a production process by 
including input prices. Cost functions transform the quantitative physical information in 
production frontiers into monetary values. Cost functions can thus convey information about 
the allocative and technical efficiencies of organisations in pecuniary terms. 
Accordingly, if we can determine production frontiers, production functions, or cost 
functions that represent total economic efficiency using the best currently known production 
techniques, then we can use this idealised yardstick to evaluate the economic performance of 
actual organisations and industries. By comparing the actual behaviour of organisations 
against the idealised benchmark of economic efficiency we can determine the degree of 
economic efficiency exhibited by some real-world agency. This general approach to efficiency 
measurement has been termed the ‘deterministic frontier approach’ (DFA). However, it may 
well be that deviation away from a given efficiency frontier may be due not to inefficiency by 
the organisation in question but rather external factors beyond its control. This has led to the EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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development of the ‘stochastic frontier approach’ (SFA) which seeks to take these external 
factors into account when estimating the efficiency of given real-world organisation.  
In contrast to both the DFA and SFA techniques, which attempt to determine the 
absolute economic efficiency of organisations against some given benchmark of efficiency, 
the ‘data envelopment analysis’ (DEA) approach seeks to evaluate the efficiency of an 
organisation relative to other organisations in the same industry. DEA thus calculates the 
economic efficiency of a given organisation relative to the performance of other organisations 
producing the same good or service rather than against an idealised standard of performance. 
An important variant of the DEA methodology often employed in the analysis of economic 
efficiency in the public sector is known as the ‘free-disposal hull’ (FDH) approach. This 
technique has the advantage of being able to determine existing best-practice in an industry on 
the basis of fewer observations and it does not assume the existence of many different ways of 
producing some good or service. We will return to these four different methods of measuring 
efficiency in our discussion of the literature on the empirical measurement of inefficiency in 
local public services below. 
In essence, the literature on frontier production and cost functions and the calculation 
of efficiency measures begins with Farrell (1957). Whilst the empirical estimation of 
production functions had begun long before Farrell’s paper, Farrell (1957) made the first 
tentative steps in adapting these to rigorous microeconomic analysis. 











In parenthesis for technically inclined readers, Farrell’s (1957) argument is contained 
in Figure 2. Here two inputs, x1 and x2, are utilised to produce a single output y, so that the 
production frontier is y = ƒ(x1,  x2). If we assume constant returns to scale (where the 
relationship between output y and inputs x1 and x2 does not change as the inputs increase), 
then 1 = ƒ( x1/y, x2/y). The isoquant of the fully efficient firm SS' permits the measurement of 
technical efficiency. An isoquant is a locus of points representing a given level of output (say, 
100 units of y) using different combinations of the two inputs x1 and x2. Now, for a given firm 
using quantities of inputs (x1* x2*) defined by point P (x1*/y, x1*/y) to produce a unit of output 
y*, the level of technical efficiency, or the ability of a firm to maximise output from a given 
set of inputs, may be defined as the ratio OQ/OP which measures the proportion of (x1, x2) 
actually necessary to produce y*. Thus 1 - OQ/OP, the technical inefficiency of the firm, 
measures the proportion by which (x1*, x2*) could be reduced (holding the input ratio x1/x2 WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
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constant) without reducing output. It also measures the possible reduction in the cost of 
producing y*. Finally, given constant returns to scale, it roughly estimates the proportion by 
which output could be increased, holding (x1* x2*) constant. Point Q, on the other hand, is 
technically efficient since it already lies on the efficient isoquant.  
If the input price ratio AA' (which computes the prices of inputs x1 and x2) is known, 
then allocative efficiency [referred to by Farrell as price efficiency], or the ability of a firm to 
use these inputs in optimal proportions, given the respective prices at point P, is the ratio 
OR/OQ, and correspondingly the allocative inefficiency is 1 - OR/OQ, where the distance RQ 
is the reduction in production costs which would occur if production occurred at Q' – the 
allocatively and technically efficient point, rather than Q – the technically efficient, but 
allocatively inefficient point. Hence, total economic efficiency [referred to by Farrell as 
overall efficiency] is the ratio OR/OP, and total inefficiency is 1 - OR/OP which is the 
possible reduction in cost from moving from P (the observed point) to Q' (the cost minimising 
point); the cost reduction achievable is the distance RP. As we have seen, technical efficiency 
can be decomposed as the product of technical and allocative efficiency; and total inefficiency 
can be decomposed roughly as the sum of technical and allocative inefficiency.  
Of course, these measures of efficiency have been defined on the assumption that the 
standard of efficient production is known. Farrell (1957) suggested the use of several known 
and observable production techniques to estimate this isoquant.  It is this suggestion that 
efficiency could be measured against an idealised frontier isoquant that then forms the basis of 
subsequent empirical analysis. More detailed analyses of the theoretical foundations of 
microeconomic efficiency measurement may be found in Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford 
(1993), Fried, Lovell and Schmidt (1993) and Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994).  
MEASURING EFFICIENCY IN LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES 
As we have seen within the theoretical framework detailed, at least four different approaches 
have been employed in the analysis of local public sector efficiency. These are: (i) the 
deterministic frontier approach (DFA); (ii) the stochastic frontier approach (SFA); (iii) the 
data envelopment analysis or DEA approach; and (iv) the Free Disposal Hull or FDH 
approach. Table 1 includes details on these several approaches. 
Firstly, as we observed earlier the deterministic frontier approach is an econometric 
technique which assumes that all deviations from the frontier are the result of inefficiency: 
that is, inefficiencies are embedded in a strictly one-sided disturbance term. Studies by Bjurek, 
Hjalmarsson and Forsund (1990) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) have used this 
approach. Secondly, as we have seen the stochastic frontier approach is also an econometric 
technique, though it assumes a two-component error structure so that the inefficiencies usually 
follow an asymmetric half-normal distribution and the random errors are normally distributed. 
Examples of work in this area include Viton (1992), Deller and Halstead (1994) and Vitaliano 
(1997). Thirdly, in line with our earlier comments the DEA approach is a mathematical 
programming technique which assumes that all deviations from the estimated frontier 
represent inefficiency. This approach has been applied to local governments by Cook, Roll 
and Kazakov (1990), Rouse, Putterill and Ryan (1995) and Worthington (1999). Finally, as 
we have noted earlier the FDH approach is a variant of DEA that allows the assumptions 
concerning the production technology to be kept to a minimum. Examples of work using this 
approach include Tulkens (1993), De Borger, Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste (1994) and De 
Borger and Kerstens (1996b).  EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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Firstly, a number of studies have used stochastic frontiers (either cost or production) to 
analyse the efficiency of the local public sector. For example, Hayes and Chang (1990) used a 
sample of 191 U.S. municipalities to test efficiency differences between ‘city manager’ and 
‘mayor-council’ forms of government. Formulating a cost frontier, they obtained total costs 
for three categories of local public sector output (ie. fire, police and refuse collection) and 
specified outputs in terms of the number of respective employees. The price of capital was 
proxied by the municipalities’ bond rating and the price of labour by the average municipal 
employee’s salary. They found that the mean cost efficiency of mayor-council municipalities 
(84.78 percent) was higher than that of city-manager type councils (81.21 percent). Put 
differently, mayor-council municipalities could reduce costs by 15.22 percent and produce the 
same level of output, while city-manager councils would need to reduce total costs by 18.79 
percent to become purely cost efficient. 
Subsequent to Hayes and Chang (1990) a number of studies also examined municipal 
service efficiency employing stochastic frontiers. Using this approach, Steven Deller made an 
extended inquiry into the efficiency of municipal road services in both Illinois, Minnesota and 
Wisconsin (Deller and Nelson, 1991; Deller, 1992; Deller, Nelson and Walzer, 1992) and 
Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont (Deller and Halstead, 1994). In the latter study a cost 
frontier was used, with the cost of capital proxied by the weighted average of new capital 
items, the price of labour by wages, and output by the length of roads under municipal 
jurisdiction. In the former studies, standard production frontiers were employed. In these cases 
there was an attempt to incorporate quality considerations into municipal output, with roads 
defined as being gravel, or low or high-volume bituminous roads. Regional cost-of-living 
indices were also included. The resultant empirical evidence indicated mutatis mutandis that 
current expenditures on rural low-volume road service were unnecessarily high because of 
managerial inefficiencies: in particular, “efficiency measurements suggested that costs could 
be reduced, on average, to 45 percent of current levels” (Deller, Nelson and Walzer, 1992: 
364). 
Secondly, an increasing number of studies have employed the nonparametric technique 
of data envelopment analysis to investigate local public sector efficiency. Cook, Roll and 
Kazakov (1990) used DEA to measure the relative efficiency of Ontario’s highway 
maintenance patrols. The inputs in this case were patrol maintenance and capital expenditures 
(along with an allowance for environmental factors) and the outputs were stipulated in terms 
of the characteristics of the roads serviced and an accident prevention factor. The resulting 
efficiency scores were then used to classify maintenance patrols into a number of classes for 
analytical purposes. One finding was that the technical efficiency of patrols where the 
proportion of ‘privatised’ work was 20 percent or more was higher than those patrols with less 
than 20 percent of privatised work.  
An identical theoretical framework and sample was subsequently employed in Cook, 
Kazakov, Roll and Seiford (1991), and Wade, Kazakov and Roll (1993). Bjurek, Kjulin and 
Gustafsson (1992) examined the technical and scale efficiency of Swedish public day-care 
centres. Inputs were defined in terms of the number of hours worked by pre-school teachers, 
nurses and cooking cleaning staff, and outputs denominated by the capacity of children, aged 
up to two years, and from 3 to 6 years. Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) examined the 
efficiency of 285 Swedish public electricity distributors. Inputs included the discretionary 
levels of labour, and the non-discretionary length of transmission lines and transformer 
capacity, and the outputs were specified in terms of both volume of kilowatts and the number 
of customers. Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) found only modest efficiency differences 
between public and private electricity distributors.  WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
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DEA has also been used in a study of New Zealand local authority road maintenance by 
Rouse, Putterill and Ryan (1995). Conceptually very similar to the earlier stochastic frontier 
work of Deller (1992) and the nonparametric approaches of Cook, Roll and Kazakov (1990) 
and Cook, Kazakov, Roll and Seiford (1991), the study incorporated environmental factors as 
major cost and process drivers. The empirical analysis contained an index of road surface 
defects and a measure of ‘roughness’ for both urban and rural roads. For the measures 
obtained under the assumption of variable returns-to-scale, 39 of a possible 62 transport local 
authorities were judged to be 100 percent technically efficient, with 12 below 70 percent, and 
the remainder between 70 and 100 percent efficiency. 
Finally, more recent work has employed the FDH approach to efficiency measurement, 
and has been based largely on studies of Belgian municipalities, with a focus on cost 
efficiency. De Borger and Kerstens (1996: 149) argue that this approach is closely related to 
the nature of the data: 
A consequence of the Belgian institutional framework is that the sample does not 
contain input price variability. There is no wage flexibility as salary scales of 
municipal personnel are completely fixed. Moreover, all municipalities have 
access to the same capital market, and in fact obtain most of their funds from one 
and the same specialised financial institution. Therefore, the assumption of 
identical input prices across municipalities may not be too unreasonable. 
Consequently, throughout the analysis we focus on the measurement of cost 
efficiency. 
Within this approach, and those followed by Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993) and 
De Borger and Kerstens (1996a, 1996b), the inputs into the FDH model are total municipal 
expenditures. The outputs are denoted in terms of variables intended to reflect the 
responsibilities of Belgian municipal governments. These include total population, length of 
roads, number of persons aged over 65 years, those living on subsistence grants, the number 
of students enrolled in local public schools, and the maintenance of recreational facilities. The 
results indicate that mean relative cost efficiency scores range from 0.57 to 0.94. Put simply, 
inputs (and therefore costs) could be reduced anywhere from 6 percent to 43 percent across 
Belgian councils. Moreover by using FDH the measure of performance is drawn from the 
actual sample so that cost efficient councils can easily be identified for benchmarking. In 
addition, productive efficiency frameworks have also been used to test the relative efficiency 
of the same sample of Belgian municipalities. De Borger, Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste 
(1994) employed an analogous conceptualisation of outputs, although inputs were measured in 
terms of white and blue-collar employee and capital stock (proxied by the surface area of 
municipal-owned buildings).  Significantly, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a; 1996b), amongst 
others, attempt to incorporate the multiple-outputs produced by Belgian municipal 
governments into a single measure of efficiency. This stands in stark contrast to the other 
work on public sector efficiency which focused on specific aspects of service provision, such 
as roads, schools, welfare services and transportation [see, for example, Bjurek, Kjulin and 
Gustafsson (1992), Tulkens (1993), Rouse, Putterill and Ryan (1995)]. 
At least three aspects of the efficiency measurement of local public services deserve 
further attention. These are: (i) the appropriateness and sensitivity of efficiency measures to 
the postulated reference technology, (ii) the appropriate treatment of non-discretionary 
inputs/outputs in local public services, and (iii) the choice of input or output orientation in 
efficiency measures. First, several studies have analysed the efficiency of local governments 
using a broad variety of reference technologies [see, for instance, Bjurek, Hjalmarsson and 
Førsund (1990), Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993), and De Borger and Kerstens EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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(1996a)]. In a study of Belgian municipalities, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) used both 
parametric (deterministic and stochastic frontiers) and non-parametric (FDH and DEA) 
methods to evaluate the sensitivity of the rankings of municipalities with respect to the 
underlying reference technology. They observed that not only may the shape of the efficiency 
distribution be affected by the use of different approaches, but that they can also alter the 
implied rankings of individual observations. Using Spearman rank correlation and Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficients, they demonstrated that statistically significant 
differences existed between FDH and DEA, whilst “DEA has a slightly higher similarity in 
ranking relative to the [parametric approaches]” (De Borger and Kerstens 1996a: 159). The 
estimated range of mean efficiency scores also was quite large, with cost efficiency measures 
between 0.59 and 0.83. Using these observations, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a: 167) 
concluded, “it would seem prudent to analyse efficiency questions using a broad variety of 
methods to check the robustness of the results”.  
Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993) undertook a similar comparison. However, 
their results were disaggregated on the basis of expenditure classifications, and thereby 
indicate how consistency between rankings may vary over the sample. Comparing FDH and 
DEA under variable returns-to-scale, constant returns-to-scale and non-increasing returns-to-
scale assumptions, they found that all three DEA methods yielded similar results for large 
expenditure class municipalities. Some 15 to 22 percent were found to be cost efficient. For 
the second expenditure class some divergence between the methods was found, and 
accordingly, concordant rankings and mean efficiency scores were once again established.  
Second, the standard Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes and 
Cooper (1984) model formulations implicitly assumed that all inputs and outputs are 
discretionary (i.e. controlled by the management of each municipality and varied at its 
discretion). In most circumstances we would expect that this assumption would not hold for 
the local public sector. For example, in a technical efficiency formulation the geographic, 
environmental and demographic characteristics of a given municipal area are important inputs 
into the process of providing local public services, yet they are also exogenously fixed and 
thereby nondiscretionary. Alternatively, in a cost efficiency model [such as those employed by 
De Borger and Kerstens (1996a)] the outputs of the local public sector relate directly to the 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the municipality. The usual case is that 
these outputs, both quantitatively and qualitatively, are largely imposed by some minimum 
state or national legislation.  
Two approaches are available to purge efficiency measures of these exogenously fixed 
nondiscretionary inputs and/or outputs. The first method is to incorporate these assumptions 
into a single-stage procedure following Banker and Morey (1986) and Golany and Roll 
(1993). Efficiency measures thus obtained are based on the premise that for an input(output)-
oriented model, it is not relevant to maximise the proportional decrease (increase) in the entire 
input (output) vector. Rather maximisations should only be determined with reference to the 
sub-vector that is composed of discretionary inputs (outputs). Examples of this approach 
include Worthington’s (1999) analysis of New South Wales local government libraries, where 
the nondiscretionary inputs include socioeconomic, demographic and geographic 
characteristics.  
The second method uses a ‘two-stage approach’. In the first stage, a frontier model in 
which only factors under a municipality’s control are included as inputs in computing 
efficiency scores. In the second stage, those efficiency scores obtained are regressed on factors 
beyond a municipality’s control. The difference between the computed efficiency score from 
the first stage and its predicted value form the second stage. The residual is used as an index WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
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for measuring ‘pure’ technical efficiency, which could be attributable to management. 
Examples of this kind of work include De Borger and Kerstens (1996a). 
The final issue revolves around the selection of an input or output orientation in 
efficiency models. For instance, in an input orientation focus falls on the proportional 
reduction of inputs to achieve efficiency, whereas in an output orientation emphasis is placed 
on the proportional augmentation of outputs. Although many contributions to the performance 
literature on the local public sector have focused on input efficiency measures [see Hayes and 
Chang (1990) and Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993)], the use of the output 
orientation is not unknown [see, for example, Deller (1992)]. Whilst the exact formulation 
will depend on a particular empirical context, De Borger and Kerstens (1996b: 11) reason as 
follows: 
In principle, the choice of orientation should be inspired by the postulated 
underlying behavioural mode. If one assumes that local governments take outputs 
as exogenous (for example, determined by citizen’s demand) and have substantial 
control over inputs, then an input orientated measure seems appropriate. Input 
measures can then detect failures to minimise costs resulting from discretionary 
power and incomplete monitoring, and provide an indication of possible cost 
reductions. If on the other hand municipalities have limited control over inputs 
and face fixed budgets, then an output oriented approach may be quite 
informative. Output measurement can then identify municipalities that fail to 
maximise the quantity of the local public services subject to the budget they face, 
and provide indications of the increase in outputs that could potentially be 
realised.  
DETERMINANTS OF LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR EFFICIENCY 
In contrast to other areas where frontier efficiency measurement techniques have been 
employed, hypotheses to explain variation in local public sector efficiency are relatively 
underdeveloped. However, three exceptions should be noted. These include empirical research 
relating to the impact of political factors, community characteristics, and the impact of 
financial structure on local public sector efficiency. 
Firstly, a number of studies have postulated a relationship between the political 
composition of the municipal council and the level of efficiency. For example, Vanden 
Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993) generate evidence for the case that political majorities are 
an explanatory factor for observed inefficiencies. Using municipalities in the (French-
speaking) Région Wallone area of Belgium, they obtained data on the three major national 
political parties (Parti Socialiste, Parti Social Chrétian, and Parti Réformateur Liberal) and 
local parties, and categorised municipalities in terms of coalition composition, party majority 
and strength and mayoral affiliation. Their results indicate that the proportion of inefficient 
municipalities is lowest for liberals and socialists, followed by anti-socialist (majorities 
obviously formed to exclude socialists), local parties, and finally tripartite coalitions. 
However, municipalities with liberals and socialists in the majority also have the highest 
proportion of efficient municipalities “by default”: that is, whilst they do constitute the 
frontier, they do not dominate any interior municipality. Vanden Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar 
(1993: 317) note that “this finding qualifies somewhat the superiority of their performance 
relative to other parties”. 
De Borger, Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste (1994) further emphasised the contention 
that a politician’s emphasis on political rather than economic rationality is likely to contribute EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
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to inefficiency. They postulate that the influence of political agents on bureaucratic selection 
and the use of explicit and implicit log-rolling may be an important factor in this process, 
which in turn is construed to be a function of the size of political coalitions. Expounding no 
compelling  a priori argument for party-related inefficiency, they incorporate a qualitative 
variable for liberal and socialist party coalitions, and a quantitative variable for the number of 
coalition partners in a tobit censored regression model. The results indicate that the number of 
coalition partners does not exert an influence on municipal efficiency, although the presence 
of liberals tends to decrease technical efficiency, while the presence of a socialist party does 
not seem to have any statistically significant effect.  
Secondly, several studies have incorporated community characteristics in two-stage 
efficiency models. For example, De Borger and Kerstens (1996a) incorporate the use of per 
capita income on the grounds that ‘bureaucratic slack’ increases with organisational income. 
In other studies they also include the proportion of the population with a primary (De Borger, 
Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste, 1993) or higher (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996b) education 
qualification to quantify political participation. Only in the case of the latter is their hypothesis 
(ie. that education increases efficiency) confirmed. In the analysis of a specific local 
government function, namely library services, Worthington (1999) specified municipal 
population and area, the proportion of the population from various groups (non-English 
speaking background, aged and students) and an index of socioeconomic disadvantage as 
relevant community characteristics. Worthington (1999: 41) concluded, “the study reinforces 
the importance of taking into account the imposed conditions that impinge upon a given local 
government’s ability to perform efficiently”. 
Vitaliano (1997) used a stochastic cost frontier to analyse the technical efficiency of 
U.S. public libraries with an expanded set of public choice-type determinants. These included 
the percentages of total funding derived from local sources, gifts and investments. His study 
concluded that “government-run libraries are 2.7% more inefficient than private not-for-
profits. And donated resources and greater reliance on local taxation are linked to less 
inefficiency” (Vitaliano, 1997: 640). Lastly, a number of studies use a broad demographic 
indicator, either total population (De Borger, Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste, 1994) or 
population density (De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a). The basic argument is that a low 
population level may inhibit exploiting economies of scale in some or all of the production 
processes. Equivalently, the cost of provision will rise with lower population density. Both of 
these studies concluded that increases in actual population and population density are 
associated with improvements in efficiency. 
The final set of explanatory variables employed relates to the fiscal parameters of the local 
public sector. For example, high tax prices may enhance the monitoring process of constituents. 
Likewise, the well-established and extensively surveyed fiscal illusion literature indicates that 
misperceived fiscal parameters, like total per capita tax burdens or total expenditure outlay; may 
increase local expenditure, and accordingly be associated with inefficiency [see Dollery and 
Worthington (1996a)]. De Borger, Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste (1994) and De Borger and 
Kerstens (1996a) use the size of intergovernmental grants to present a case for the influence of 
the flypaper effect in particular. The results in both cases are generally similar to those of De 
Borger, Kerstens, Moesen and Vanneste (1994: 353) where “grants may not only encourage 
local service provision, but that they also lead to some additional technical inefficiency…the 
local tax rates that we experimented with failed to produce significant estimates”. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
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Whilst relatively underdeveloped, especially when compared to the extensive financial services 
literature, a good foundation for frontier efficiency measurement of local public sector efficiency 
has nevertheless been laid. Problems do remain. For example, the appropriate behavioural 
specifications to employ, problems with unmeasured inputs and outputs, and the choice between 
alternative computational techniques. However, these are no more insurmountable than related 
issues that have arisen in the adjacent fields of financial services, health, education, amongst 
others. To some extent, the lessons learned from these related areas serve as useful pointers to 
solutions in the analysis of local public sector efficiency. That said, empirical analysis of local 
public sector efficiency suggests that it is a unique product of complex non-discretionary inputs 
and outputs and constraints, multiple-inputs and outputs, and inherently complicated political, 
institutional and cultural factors.  
What implication can then be drawn from the preceding discussion of frontier efficiency 
measurement for practitioners in local government? In the first place, despite significant 
technical advances in the application of frontier efficiency measurement techniques to the local 
public sector, as we have seen there are important caveats in the manner in which their results 
should be treated. For example, most efficient measurement methodologies embody both 
discretionary variables (ie. those variables which can be controlled by management) and non-
discretionary variables (ie. those variables which are exogenously determined and cannot be 
influenced by management). Obviously the spatial distribution of local government (with 
attendant differences in climatic conditions, socioeconomic characteristics of the jurisdictional 
population, regional input price variations, etc.) and structural constraints imposed by higher 
levels of government (competitive tendering procedures, accounting methodologies, rate-
capping, etc.) can greatly influence the efficiency of local government operations. Likewise, the 
idiosyncrasies arising from elected municipal councils (political interference with operational 
matters, special interest considerations, etc.) imply that local government managers are once 
again constrained by a host of non-discretionary factors in arriving at efficient outcomes. 
Accordingly, frontier efficiency measurement techniques that do not explicitly acknowledge the 
significance of these factors should be treated with caution. 
Secondly, the complex politicised milieu of local government implies that the 
effectiveness of services is at least as important as economic efficiency in gauging the success of 
specific municipalities facing different demands. Frontier efficiency measurement is concerned 
only with the dimensions of economic efficiency and takes no account of the effectiveness of 
service provision. It is thus, at best, only a partial view of the operations of councils. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, frontier efficiency measurement techniques are 
increasingly applied to local governments throughout the developed world. The results of these 
statistical exercises will surely continue to show differences in efficiency within and between 
local authorities. Moreover critics of local government will doubtless seize on results of this 
kind as a means of attacking existing service provision and its management. Clearly, familiarity 
with frontier efficiency measurement techniques and their drawbacks will assist local 
government practitioners in dealing with this kind of criticism. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ammons, D.N., 1986, ‘Common Barriers to Productivity Improvement in Local Government’, in Holzer and 
Halachmi, 1986. 
Ammons, D.N., 1992, ‘Productivity Barriers in the Public Sector’, in Holzer, 1992. 
Banker, R.D. and Morey, R.C., 1986, ‘The Use of Categorical Variables in Data Envelopment Analysis’, 
Management Science, 32, pp. 1613–1627. EFFICIENCY MEASUREMENT IN THE LOCAL PUBLIC SECTOR 
 
15
Banker, R.D. Charnes, A. and Cooper, W.W., 1984, ‘Some Models for Estimating Technical and Scale 
Inefficiencies in Data Envelopment Analysis’, Management Science, 30, pp. 1078–1092. 
Bjurek, H. Hjalmarsson, L. and Førsund, F.R., 1990, Deterministic Parametric and Nonparametric Estimation of 
Efficiency in Service Production: A Comparison’, Journal of Econometrics, 46, pp. 213–227. 
Bjurek, H. Kjulin, U. and Gustafsson, B., 1992, ‘Efficiency, Productivity and Determinants of Inefficiency at 
Public Day Care Centers in Sweden’, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94, pp. 173–187. 
Carter, N. Klein, R. and Day, P., 1995, How Organisations Measure Success: The Use of Performance 
Indicators in Government (London, Routledge). 
Chang, K.P. and Kao, P.H., 1992, ‘The Relative Efficiency of Public versus Private Municipal Bus Firms: An 
Application of Data Envelopment Analysis’, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 3, pp. 67–84. 
Charnes, A. Cooper, W.W. and Li, S., 1989, ‘Using Data Envelopment Analysis to Evaluate Efficiency in the 
Economic Performance of Chinese Cities’, Socio-Economic Planning Science, 23, pp. 325–344. 
Charnes, A. Cooper, W.W. and Rhodes, E., 1978, ‘Measuring the Efficiency of Decision Making Units’, 
European Journal of Operational Research, 2, pp. 429–444. 
Charnes, A. Cooper, W.W. Lewin, A.Y. and Seiford, L.M., 1993, Data Envelopment Analysis: Theory, 
Methodology and Applications (Boston, Kluwer). 
Cook, W.D. Kazakov, A. and Roll, Y., 1993, ‘On the Measurement and Monitoring of Relative Efficiency of 
Highway Maintenance Patrols’, in Charnes, Cooper, Lewin and Seiford, 1993. 
Cook, W.D. Kazakov, A. Roll, Y. and Seiford, L.M., 1991, ‘A Data Envelopment Approach to Measuring 
Efficiency: Case Analysis of Highway Maintenance Patrols’, Journal of Socio-Economics, 20, pp. 83–103. 
Cook, W.D. Roll, Y. and Kazakov, A., 1990, ‘A DEA Model for Measuring the Relative Efficiency of Highway 
Maintenance Patrols’, Informational Systems and Operational Research, 28, pp. 113–124. 
De Borger, B. and Kerstens, K., 1996a, ‘Cost Efficiency of Belgian Local Governments: A Comparative 
Analysis of FDH, DEA and Econometric Approaches’, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 26, pp. 145–
170. 
De Borger, B. and Kerstens, K., 1996b, ‘Radial and Nonradial Measures of Technical Efficiency: An Empirical 
Illustration for Belgian Local Governments using an FDH Reference Technology’, Journal of Productivity 
Analysis, 7, pp. 5–18. 
De Borger, B. Kerstens, K. Moesen, W. and Vanneste, J., 1994, ‘Explaining Differences in Productive 
Efficiency: An Application to Belgian Municipalities’, Public Choice, 80, pp. 339–358. 
Deller, S.C. and Halstead, J.M., 1994, ‘Efficiency in the Production of Rural Road Services: The Case of New 
England Towns’, Land Economics, 70, pp. 247–259. 
Deller, S.C. and Nelson, C.H., 1991, ‘Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Producing Rural Road Services’, 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 72, pp. 194–201. 
Deller, S.C. and Rudnicki, E.R., 1992, ‘Managerial Efficiency in Local Government: Implications on 
Jurisdictional Consolidation’, Public Choice, 74, pp. 221–231. 
Deller, S.C. Nelson, C.H. and Walzer, N., 1992, ‘Measuring Managerial Efficiency in Rural Government’, 
Public Productivity and Management Review, 15, pp. 355–370. 
Deller, S.C., 1992, ‘Production Efficiency in Local Government: A Parametric Approach’, Public 
Finance/Finances Publiques, 47, pp. 32–44. 
Dollery, B.E. and Worthington, A.C., 1996a, ‘The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion’, Journal of Economic 
Surveys, 10, pp. 261–297. 
Dollery, B.E. and Worthington, A.C., 1996b, ‘The Evaluation of Public Policy: Normative Economic Theories of 
Government Failure’, Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 7, pp. 27–39. 
Epstein, P.D., 1992, ‘Measuring the Performance of Public Services’, in Holzer, 1992. 
Färe, R. Grosskopf, S. and Lovell, C.A.K., 1994, Production Frontiers (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press). 
Farrell, M.J., 1957, ‘The Measurement of Productive Efficiency’, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 120, 
pp. 253–289. 
Fried, H.O. Lovell C.A. and Schmidt, S.S., 1993, The Measurement of Productive Efficiency: Techniques and 
Applications (New York, Oxford University Press). 
Ganley, J.A. and Cubbin, J.S., 1992, Public Sector Efficiency Measurement: Applications of Data Envelopment 
Analysis (Amsterdam, North Holland). WORTHINGTON AND DOLLERY 
 
16
Golany, B. and Roll, Y., 1993, ‘Some Extensions of Techniques to Handle Non-discretionary Factors in Data 
Envelopment Analysis’, Journal of Productivity Analysis, 4, pp. 419–432. 
Grosskopf, S. and Yaisawarng, S., 1990, ‘Economies of Scope in the Provision of Local Public Services’, 
National Tax Journal, 43, pp. 61–74. 
Hatry, H.P. and Fisk, D.M., 1992, ‘Measuring Productivity in the Public Sector’, in Holzer, 1992. 
Hayes, K. and Chang, S., 1990, ‘The Relative Efficiency of City Manager and Mayor-Council Forms of 
Government’, Southern Economic Journal, 57, pp. 167–77. 
Hjalmarsson, L. and Veiderpass, A., 1992, ‘Efficiency and Ownership in Swedish Electricity Retail Distribution’, 
Journal of Productivity Analysis, 3, pp. 7–23. 
Holzer, M. and Halachmi, A., 1986, Strategic Issues in Public Sector Productivity: The Best of Public 
Productivity Review 1975–1985 (San Francisco, Jossey–Bass). 
Holzer, M., 1992, Public Productivity Handbook (New York, Marcel Dekker),. 
Industry Commission, 1997, Performance Measures for Councils: Improving Local Government Performance 
Indicators (Melbourne, AGPS). 
Johnson, R.W. and Lewin, A.Y., 1984, ‘Management and Accountability Models of Public Sector Performance’, 
in Miller, 1984. 
Mann, S.Z., 1986, ‘The Politics of Productivity: State and Local Focus’, in Holzer and Halachmi, 1986.  
Mark, J.A., 1986, ‘Measuring Productivity in Government: Federal, State and Local’, in Holzer and Halachmi, 
1986. 
Miller, G.J., 1992, ‘Productivity and the Budget Process’, in Holzer, 1992. 
Miller, T.C. 1984, Public Sector Performance: A Conceptual Turning Point (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins 
University Press). 
Rouse, P. Putterill, M. and Ryan, D., 1995, Measuring the Performance of New Zealand Local Authority 
Maintenance Activities in Roading Using Data Envelopment Analysis. Paper presented to the New England 
Conference on Efficiency and Productivity, 23-24 November, University of New England. 
Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision (SCRCSSP), 1998, Data 
Envelopment Analysis: A Technique for Measuring the Efficiency of Government Service Delivery (AGPS, 
Canberra). 
Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service Provision (SCRCSSP), 1997, Report on 
Commonwealth/State Service Provision (Canberra, AGPS). 
Tulkens, H., 1993, On FDH Efficiency Analysis: Some Methodological Issues and Applications to Retail 
Banking, Courts, and Urban Transport’, The Journal of Productivity Analysis, 4, pp. 183–210. 
Vanden Eeckaut, P.J. Tulkens, H. and Jamar, M.A., 1993, ‘Cost efficiency in Belgian municipalities’, in Fried, 
Lovell and Schmidt, 1993. 
Vitaliano, D.F., 1997, ‘X-Inefficiency in the Public Sector: The Case of Libraries’, Public Finance Review, 25, 
pp. 629–643. 
Vitaliano, D.F., 1998, ‘Assessing Public Library Efficiency using Data Envelopment Analysis’, Annals of Public 
and Co-operative Economics, 69, pp. 107–122. 
Viton, P.A., 1992, ‘Consolidations of Scale and Scope in Urban Transport’, Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 22, pp. 25–49. 
Wolf, C., 1993, Markets or Governments: Choosing Between Imperfect Alternatives (Cambridge, MIT Press).  
Worthington, A.C., 1999, ‘Performance Indicators and Efficiency Measurement in Public Libraries’, Australian 
Economic Review, 32, pp. 31–42.  
 
TABLE 1. Applications in local public services 
Author(s) Methodology
a Sample
b  Inputs, outputs, explanatory variables






Cost function  305 U.K. local 
authorities, 
1983-85. 
Total costs of refuse collection. 
Frequency of collection, method of pickup, density of units, distance to disposal 
points, percentage of household units, amount of waste paper reclaimed, number 
of abandoned vehicles collected and bottle-banks operated, average earnings of 




Costs significantly lower for 
tendered collection services. 
Tendering results in a 












Total costs, hourly wage rates, input prices for materials and operations, regional 
cost-of-living index, replacement prices for earth graders and trucks, index of 
utilisation and intergovernmental road aid. 
Miles of paved, aggregated surface, and low and high bituminous surface roads. 
Interpretation of 
parameter estimates. 
Joint use of inputs produces 
lower overall costs, emphasis 
on local government 
consolidation or contract 





DEA 28  Chinese 
cities, 
1983/84. 
Number of industrial staff and workers, amount of ‘circulating’ capital and total 
annual wage bill, investment on capital construction of state-owned units and 
acquisition of machinery and fixed assets for collective units. 
Gross industrial output value, profits and taxes generated by state-owned 
enterprises, retail sales. 
Descriptive analysis 
across time and 
interpretation of scale 
economies. 
DEA as a tool to identify 













offices,   
1974-84. 
Number of working days, capital (proxied by office space and computer 
terminals). 
Income evaluation assessments, sickness reports and control minor 




Differences in efficiency due 









Maintenance and capital expenditures, climatic factor. 
Area served factor (including length of road section, shoulder width, road service 
type, winter operations and number of lanes), average traffic served, pavement 












DEA 49  Californian 
municipalities,  
1982, 
Aggregate total and variable costs. 
Capital outlays, police and fire employment. 
Interpretation of 
parameter estimates 
and efficiency indexes. 
Economies of scope, and 










Total costs (fire, police and refuse collection), cost of capital (municipal bond 
rating), cost of labour (average salary), percentage of owner-occupied housing, 
minority households, population aged over 25 tears, and fir rating. 
Number of police, fire and refuse collection employees. 
Descriptive analysis, 
ANOVA, Median and 
Kruskal-Wallis tests of 
efficiency between 
mayor-council and city 
manager-type 
municipalities. 
No difference in the 
efficiency of different 
municipal government 





b  Inputs, outputs, explanatory variables










Maintenance and capital expenditures, climatic factor. 
Area served factor (including length of road section, shoulder width, road service 
type, winter operations and number of lanes), average traffic served, pavement 
rating change factor and accident prevention factor (number of road accidents). 
Descriptive analysis 
and comparison of 
efficiency scores across 
privatised/non-
privatised patrols and 
traffic level. 










Number of full-time equivalent labour, road graders, single-axle trucks, amount 
of purchased surface material, price of labour (average annual salary), price of 
capital (fixed proportion of depreciated capital values), price of surfacing 
material (estimates of material requirements for re-surfacing projects), regional 
cost-of-living indexes. 
Miles of gravel, and low and high bituminous roads. 
Descriptive analysis on 
sample disaggregated 
by mileage range, 
Anova, Wilcoxon, van 
der Waerden and 
Savage tests of 
efficiency equality 
across mileage ranges. 
Increases in jurisdictional 
size associated with 









Number of hours worked by pre-school teachers, nursery nurses and cooking and 
cleaning personnel, size of centre in square metres. 
Full-time equivalent capacity, 0-2 years and 3-6 years. 
Days worked by substitute teachers and nurses, mean parental income, years of 
experience of centre director, index of director co-operation. 
Second-stage tobit 
regression. 
DEA assessment of 
efficiency in 
bureaucratically-controlled 
units. Role of administrative 
staff in efficiency. 
Chang and 
Kao (1992) 
DEA 5  Taipei 
municipal bus 
firms,      
1956-88. 
Capital (number of buses in operation), number of full-time equivalent labour, 
amount of diesel fuel used. 
Vehicle kilometres, revenue, number of bus traffic trips on routes. 
Descriptive analysis 
and Wilcoxon, Mann-
Whitney tests of 
efficiency differences 
over time and 
private/public firms. 
Publicly-owned bus firms 
increased efficiency after 
liberalisation of bus routes. 







Number of full-time equivalent labour, road graders, single-axle trucks, amount 
of purchased surface material, price of labour (average annual salary), price of 
capital (fixed proportion of depreciated capital values), price of surfacing 
material (estimates of material requirements for re-surfacing projects), regional 
cost-of-living indexes. 
Miles of gravel, and low and high bituminous roads. 
Descriptive analysis on 
sample disaggregated 
by mileage range, 
Anova, Wilcoxon, van 
der Waerden and 
Savage tests of 
efficiency equality 
across mileage ranges. 
Need for productive 
efficiency of local 
government due to federal 












Average total school expenditure costs, average daily attendance, male and 
female teacher salaries, administration expenses per pupil, operations and 
maintenance expenditures per pupil. 




regression on school 
size. 
Managerial inefficiencies 
may be incorrectly attributed 
to size economies. 
Consolidation may be 





b  Inputs, outputs, explanatory variables












Number of full-time equivalent labour, road graders, single-axle trucks, amount 
of purchased surface material, price of labour (average annual salary), price of 
capital (fixed proportion of depreciated capital values), price of surfacing 
material (estimates of material requirements for re-surfacing projects), regional 
cost-of-living indexes. 
Miles of gravel, and low and high bituminous roads. 
Disaggregation of 
efficiency index across 
township road size. 
High cost inefficiencies, 
gains in efficiency largely 











Hours worked by all employees, kilometres of low-voltage and high-voltage 
electricity power lines, total transformer capacity. 
Consumption of low-voltage and high-voltage electricity, numbers of low-
voltage and high-voltage electricity customers. 
Descriptive analysis.  Impact of not-for-profit 
constraints on efficiency of 
municipal distributors, 
modest difference between 
public and private firms. 




transit firms,    
1984-1986. 
Total operating expenses. 
Motorbus, rail, streetcar, trolleybus vehicle miles, hourly wage rates, ratio of 
peak operating fleet to base operating period, speed of transport (ratio of vehicle-
miles to vehicle-hours), dummy variable for transport-type. 
Interpretation of 
parameter estimates, 
implied impact of 
single-firm municipal 
consolidation. 
Economies of scope 
exhausted before scale 
economies are attained. 
Consolidation will reduce 









Total hours of labour worked, energy (in kWh), number of seats-vehicles. 
Number of monthly seat-kilometres. 
Descriptive analysis 
over time. 
Application of efficiency 











Total costs,  
Total population, length of roads in municipality, numbers of persons aged over 
65 years, beneficiaries of minimal subsistence grants, crimes reported, students 
enrolled in local primary schools. 
Dummy variables for socialist, liberal, anti-socialist, local, and coalition 
dominated municipalities. 
Disaggregation of 
efficiency scores across 
political majorities. 
Multi-party, local coalition-
led municipalities less 
efficient than single-party, 




DEA 62  Ontario 
highway 
maintenance 
patrols, 1990.  
Maintenance and capital expenditures, climatic factor. 
Area served factor (including length of road section, shoulder width, road service 
type, winter operations and number of lanes), average traffic served, pavement 
rating change factor and accident prevention factor (number of road accidents). 
Descriptive analysis 
and comparison of 
efficiency scores across 
privatised/non-
privatised patrols and 
traffic level. 
Unbounded DEA will not 







FDH 589  Belgian 
municipalities,  
1985. 
Number of white-collar and blue-collar municipal employees, capital stock 
(proxied by surface area of municipal owned buildings). 
Municipal road surface, numbers of beneficiaries of minimal subsistence grants, 
students enrolled in local primary schools, surface of area of public recreational 
facilities, ratio of non-residents to residents in municipality. 
Dummy variable for liberal or socialist party as ruling coalition, average personal 





Scale and fiscal revenue 
capacity are important 





b  Inputs, outputs, explanatory variables












Total road costs, labour wages, price of grader and single-axle-dump truck, cost 
of capital (weighted average of new capital items by municipal bond interest 
rate). 
Miles of roads under town jurisdiction. 
Chief engineers formal training, educational level, years of experience and age. 
Interpretation of 
parameter estimates, 
Anova, Wilcoxon, van 
der Waerden and 
Savage tests of 
efficiency equality 
across characteristics of 
chief engineer. 















Total expenditure on reseals, rehabilitation, and general maintenance, index of 
environmental factors. 
Kilometres of road resealed and rehabilitated, general maintenance expenditure, 
annual vehicle kilometres, roughness index for urban and rural roads, index of 
road surface defects. 
Interpretation of 
efficiency scores across 
a number of input-
output specifications. 
Insights into local authority 
efficiency by partitioning 
measures across efficiency, 













Number of beneficiaries of minimal subsistence grants and students enlisted in 
local primary schools, surface area of public recreational facilities, total 
population and proportion of population over 65 years. 
Per capita personal income, municipal property tax rate, per capita block grants, 
number of coalition parties in government, dummy variable for liberal or socialist 
ruling party, proportion of adults with primary education as highest qualification, 
population density.  
Descriptive analysis, 





Rank correlation between 
parametric and 
nonparametric measures low. 
Local tax rates and education 
influence efficiency 
positively, per capita grants 








Total municipal expenditures. 
Surface of municipal roads, number of beneficiaries of minimal subsistence 
grants, students enrolled in local primary schools, surface area of public 
recreational facilities, total population and proportion of population aged over 65 
years. 
Municipal property tax rate, per capita block grants, number of coalition parties 
in government, dummy variable for liberal or socialist ruling party, proportion of 




Substantial differences in 
inefficiency measures 
possible. Fiscal revenue 
capacity and grants an 






235 U.S. public 
libraries, 1992.
Total costs (excluding capital equipment), librarian starting salary wage rate, 
director’s salary wage rate. 
Total circulation of books and serials, weekly hours of operation, number of 
books added to collection each year.  
Dummy variable for municipal or private not-for-profit library, percentage of 
local funding, gifts and investments, population served. 
Second-stage tobit 
regression. 
Government -run libraries 
are more inefficient than 
private not-for-profits. 
Donated resources and 
reliance on local taxation 
linked to less inefficiency. 
Vitaliano 
(1998)  
DEA  184 New York 
state public 
libraries, 1992.
Total holdings (books, audio-visual, maps, etc.), hours of operation, new books 
purchased, total serial subscriptions. 
Total circulation, reference questions answered. 





relatively more efficient. 
Dominant determinant of 
inefficiency are excessive 





b  Inputs, outputs, explanatory variables
c   Analytical technique  Main findings 
Worthington 
(1999) 
DEA  168 NSW local 
government 
libraries, 1993.
Population, area, proportion of population NESB, aged, or student, proportion of 
non-residential borrowers, socio-economic index, gross library expenditure. 
Library issues. 






Case for exogenous factors 
and scale effects to be 
incorporated into DEA. 
Notes: (a) DEA – Data Envelopment analysis, FDH – Free Disposal Hull; (b) Singular dates represent calendar or financial year cross-sections, intervals represent time-series; (c)  Ranked in 
order by paragraph. 
 